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Advances in nuclear and diesel-electric submarine
technology have reduced the effectiveness of passive means of
detection. The United States is faced with a multipolar
threat in part due to the proliferation to Third World nations
of advanced diesel-electric submarines. The use of active
sonar must be explored to gain back the detection advantage
the United States submarine force has enjoyed in the past.
The use of bistatic sonar reduces the counter-detection threat
resulting from active sonar.
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THESIS DISCLAIMER
The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed
in this research may not have been exercised for all cases of
interest. While effort has been made, within the time
available, to ensure that the programs are free of
computational and logic errors, they cannot be considered
validated. Any application of these programs without
additional verification is at the risk of the user.
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The purpose of this thesis is to study an application of
active bistatic sonar to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) . In an
active monostatic sonar system the source platform acts both
as a source and receiver. A bistatic sonar system
incorporates a separate source and receiver platform.
Specifically, this research will concentrate on the use of an
active bistatic sonar system to protect a channel from a
transiting enemy submarine. A mathematical model can be
developed to calculate signal excess as the enemy submarine
transits down the channel for a given location of the source
and receiver. This signal excess can be represented as a
detection probability, which will be used as the payoff in a
two-person zero-sum game.
B . BACKGROUND
Recent political changes in Russia and other former
communist countries have resulted in a significant reduction
of the perceived Eastern Bloc threat to the United States.
The immediate cost of the Cold War victory is decreased world
stability. Diminished Russian global influence has caused the
instability throughout the Third World [Ref. l:p. 146].
Reduced world stability has forced the United States to face
a new multipolar threat. Consequently, U.S. military
strategists now place a much higher priority on regional
conflict planning. For the ASW mission, the United States
must now also contend with diesel-electric submarines
operating on their batteries, quieter nuclear submarines, and
a shift in policy from preparing for global warfare to
littoral warfare. The Russian navy, especially their
submarine force, remains a viable fighting force.
The ASW advantage enjoyed by the United States and its
allies has steadily decreased. Over the last ten years
Russian submarines have undergone significant reductions of
their radiated noise signatures [Ref . l:p. 146] . During this
same period improvements of passive detection by the United
States advanced at a slower rate. The proliferation of
advanced diesel-electric submarines to Third World nations
adds a new dimension to the ASW problem for the United States.
The new diesel-electric submarines are capable of extended
patrols without having to snorkel as frequently as in the
past. New battery technology provides a cheap alternative to
nuclear submarines for Third World countries. To maintain its
advantage over other countries in ASW, the United States must
revolutionize detection technology.
1. Historical Perspective
The early 1960s saw the beginning of the tactical and
strategic development of nuclear submarines. The United
States development was significantly different from the Soviet
Union's. The United States invested in maintaining vital sea
lanes of communications and assuring freedom of navigation in
forward areas. To support this global ASW mission, the United
States concentrated on the development of highly capable
passive sonar systems, gaining a significant ASW advantage.
For three decades after World War II the United States
submarine force enjoyed a tactical and strategic advantage
over the Soviet Union's submarine and ASW forces.
Since the late 1970s the United States ability to
detect enemy submarines by passive means has significantly
decreased. During the period 1975 to 1988, the radiated noise
signal levels of Soviet submarines dropped by 3 dB or by a
factor of 1000 [Ref . l:p. 146] . The increased use of diesel-
electric submarines by Third World countries compounds the
passive detection problem.
Active sonar does not rely on target generated noise
as with passive detection. The greatest concern for active
sonar is counter-detection. It is very difficult for a
submarine to remain undetected when using active sonar.
However, accurate bearing and range information can be
gathered by using active sonar. With passive systems only
bearings can be found, thus requiring target motion analysis
to find the range to the target.
2. Bistatic versus Monostatic Active Sonar
The most significant problem of active sonar is the
loss of stealth of the searching platform. An active sonar
can typically be detected by another platform at twice the
detection range of the searching platform. The sound must
travel both directions for the searcher but only one direction
for the potential target platform.
With the use of a bistatic active sonar, where the
transmitter (source) and receiver are two different platforms,
the searching ship can remain undetected but also take
advantage of the active sonar. It is, however, important to
ensure the receiver is not counter-detected by the target as
active sonar does not discriminate between searcher and
target
.
C. DESCRIPTION OF BISTATIC SEARCH SCENARIO
A source and receiver platform are searching out a
rectangular barrier area attempting to detect and locate a
transiting enemy submarine. The target submarine's
orientation is known by the receiver and source platform. The
receiver is placed within the barrier for two reasons. First,
to constrain the problem to help make it solvable, and second,
to keep the receiver within range to prosecute the target if
necessary. The source platform can be located inside or
outside the barrier area. The target enters the barrier along
one side and transits through. Figure 1 shows the target




Figure 1 . Target entry point into the barrier
The detection probability can be calculated, for a fixed
source location, for each given case of target entry and
receiver location. These probabilities represent a payoff
matrix. On one axis of the matrix are the receiver locations
and the other axis are the target entry points. To determine
the result for a given combination of receiver location and
target entry point, the detection probability for the receiver
is the intersection point within the payoff matrix. The
receiver does not know where the target will enter the
barrier. The target also does not know where the receiver is
located within the barrier. The receiver desires to maximize
this value of detection, where the target wants to minimize
the value. This method of one side maximizing and the other
side minimizing is a two-person zero-sum game [Ref . 2:pp. 10-
11] .
There are two possible outputs to a two-person zero-sum
game, a pure strategy and a mixed strategy. The pure strategy
means that the element within the matrix represents both the
largest column and the smallest row value [Ref . 2:p. 11] or in
other words, the matrix contains a saddle point. The mixed
strategy occurs when no saddle point exists, thus there is a
probability distribution of pure strategies [Ref. 2:pp. 12-
13] .
In the evaluation of the payoff matrix formed by the
model, the underlying desire is for a single pure strategy for
any given case of a fixed source location. If there is a
saddle point, the model results provide the receiver an
optimal pure strategy to detect a transiting submarine through
the barrier. If however, the results yield no saddle point,
a mixed strategy is required and thus the receiver and the





The mathematical model incorporates the bistatic active
sonar equation to determine the optimal strategy for a
receiver and a source to detect a transiting enemy submarine.
The bistatic active sonar equation is
SE = SL-TLST -TLTR -NL-DT+TS +AG. (D
Where SE is the mean signal excess, SL is the source level of
the active transmission from the source platform, TLST is the
transmission loss from the source to the target, TL^ is the
transmission loss from the target to the receiver, NL is the
ambient noise level of the surrounding sea, DT is the
detection threshold of the receiver sonar system, TS is the
bistatic target strength, and AG is the array gain of the
receiver sonar. All parameters are measured in decibels (dB)
and referenced to 1 micropascal
.
Signal excess (SE) is assumed to be a normal random
variable with mean given in equation 1 and standard deviation
a. Detection occurs whenever SE>0 . The probability of
detection is
P(SE>0) =9(— ) , (2)
o
where <& is the cumulative normal distribution and a is the
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standard deviation [Ref . 3:p. 3-2] . Typical values for a are
between 3 and 9 dB [Ref. 3:p. 3-2] . The value of G for the
model is set at 8 dB . For computational purposes, a
polynomial approximation to O from the Handbook of
Mathematical Functions [Ref. 4:p. 932] was used.
The fictional active low frequency source is assumed to
have a source level (SL) of 220 dB re 1 micropascal. This
source level provides a theoretical detection range in excess
of 300 nautical miles (nm) [Ref. l:p. 152] .
Transmission loss (TL) results from attenuation and
spreading. The model assumes the spreading loss is due to
spherical spreading with no transition to cylindrical
spreading. This assumption yields reasonable fits to actual
measured data under various conditions, Urick [Ref. 5:p. 110] .
Transmission loss can be expressed as
TL = 201ogR + aRxlO' 3
,
(3)
from Urick [Ref. 5:pp. 110-111] , where R is the range in yards
from either the source to the target or the target to the
receiver and a is the absorption coefficient in dB per




+ ^0^ +2. 7 5 xl0~4 f 2 +0.003, (4)
1+f 2 4,100+f 2
where f is the search frequency expressed in kHz [Ref. 5:p.
108] . For the model, f is assumed to be 0.1 kHz.
The background noise is assumed to be ambient noise
limited, vice reverberation limited. The average noise level
(NL) is 63 dB re 1 micropascal for the search frequency of 100
Hz found on the Wentz-Knudsen curves [Ref . 5:p. 210] . Figure
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Figure 2. Average deep-water ambient-noise spectra
The detection threshold (DT) for the receiver sonar is 12
dB re 1 micropascal. Detection threshold can be calculated
from one of two different cases [Ref 5:p. 394] . Case I
assumes a known signal in Gaussian noise and a fixed point
target at a known range. Case II assumes an unknown signal
and a target of unknown range and range rate. Case II yields
a higher value and thus is a more conservative estimate of
detection threshold. Case II detection threshold is
Dr=5log dw (5)
where d, the detection index, is determined by the specified
probability of detection and probability of false alarm.
Selecting values for probability of detection (Pd) equal to
90% and probability of false alarm (Pfa) equal to 0.01%,
yields d= 25. W is the frequency bandwidth (100 Hz) and t is
the pulse duration (10 seconds) . [Ref . l:p. 150]
.
The bistatic target strength (TS) is a function of the
minimum (TSalB ) and maximum monostatic target strength ( TS,,^)
and the bistatic angle (6 fl ) formed by the relative angles, (6 S )
and (9S ) , between the source and the target, and the receiver
and the target, respectfully. Figure 3 contains a visual
representation of the bistatic angle.
Transmitter r^
6 B= 0.5(6 R +e T)
Receiver
Figure 3. Bistatic angle for target strength calculation.
The equation for target strength is given by
TS= ( TSm - TSm±n ) * rsmin sin2 (6 fl ) , ( 6 )
where, for a typical submarine, TSmax=25 dB and TSmin=12 dB re
1 micropascal . [Ref. 6:p. 2-3].
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The final term for the active bistatic sonar equation is
the array gain (AG). Array gain is a measure of the sonar's
ability to increase the ratio of the submarine signature to
the background noise. Array gain of 15 dB re 1 micropascal is
consistent with the conclusions of Stefanick's work [Ref . 7:p.
257] .
B. COMPUTER MODEL
The code for the computer model is written in Turbo Pascal
6.0 for DOS based computers. The computer program calculates
the detection probability of the target as it transits through
the barrier for a fixed entry point for the target and a fixed
receiver and source position.
1. Inputs to Model
There are two input files for the main program. The
first file contains specific information about the barrier,
receiver, target, and source. The dimensions (width and
depth) of the barrier are provided by the input file. Inputs
for the receiver consist of the step size for receiver
location in both the X and Y axis, and the detection threshold
and array gain of the receiver sonar system. For the target,
the step size for the target's barrier entry, speed of the
target during transit and its minimum and maximum monostatic
target strength are provided. The source inputs include
active sonar pulse frequency, pulse length, ping interval,
source level of active sonar and ambient background noise
11
level. The second input file contains all source locations to
evaluated
.
2 . Main Program
The program calculates for each given receiver
position and target entry point, with a fixed source position,
the detection probability for target transit through the
barrier. The target entry points are based on the user input
of the width and depth of the barrier, and the step size for
target entry. For example, if the barrier is 200 kiloyards
(kyds) in width, 40 kyds in depth and the target entry step
size is 10 kyds then the target would enter the barrier at X
position equal to ( , 10 , 20 , 30 , . . . , 200 ) kyds with Y position
equal 40 kyds. Based on the same width and depth of the
barrier as above and with user input of step size of 5 kyds
for both the X and Y position for the receiver, the receiver
would be located at all possible combinations of X positions
of (0, 5, 10, . . . ,200) kyds and Y positions of ( , 5, 10 , . . . , 40
)
kyds .
To determine the overall detection probability for the
target transit, the signal excess is calculated using the
active bistatic sonar equation for the receiver at fixed
points for the target on the transit. The signal excess can
be represented as a detection probability as previously
discussed in the Model Assumptions section. The probability
of no detection is found by taking one minus the probability
of detection. By taking one minus the product of all the
12
probabilities of no detection the overall detection
probability is determined as shown by
vi-nii-p/i, (7>
where Pd is the overall probability of detection of the
transit and p/ is the probability of detection of the target
on the i cb ping. Each Pd* is assumed to be independent as the
time between pings is typically greater than 5 minutes. The
fixed points are based on the speed of the target, ping
interval of the source active sonar and the length of the
barrier. Each ping of the active sonar represents a fixed
point for the target . Between pings the target advances
through the barrier based on its speed.
Each possible entry point for the target is evaluated
for detection probability (Axy.,) for a fixed receiver and
source position. Axyz is the probability of detection for a
given (x,y) coordinate position of the receiver and entry
point z for the target. This procedure is repeated for all
possible receiver position combinations. The results for each
possible combination of target entry and receiver position is
written to an output file. The program is rerun for each
possible source location. The code is shown in Appendix A.
3 . GAMS Interface
The output from the program forms a probability matrix
with one axis receiver position and the other target entry
point. This probability matrix is for a given source
13
position. Each different source position forms another
separate probability matrix. Using Game Theory, the
probability matrix can be evaluated to find an optimal
strategy for both the receiver and the target. To find the
optimal strategy numerous simultaneous equations must be
solved. This problem can be formulated into a linear program
as shown below:
maximize V






where m and n represents the number of different X and Y
positions for the receiver respectfully, and q is the number
of different entry points into the barrier for the target. V
represents the overall probability of detection of the target
for the optimal strategy (value of the game) [Ref. 8:pp. 31-
32] . Axyz is defined in the previous section. The z value for
the target represents the X coordinate position as the Y
coordinate position is at the top of the barrier. P^
represents the percentage the receiver should spend in a given
(x,y) coordinate position. The typical problem size, used
specifically for this model, had 22 constraining equations and
369 variables.
The General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) MIN0S5
linear program solver, version 2.25, was used to solve the
linear program. Appendix B contains the model file for the
14
solver. DOS batch files were used to integrate the Pascal
code and the GAMS solver.
4. Counter-detection Determination
Three methods were considered for calculating the
counter-detection threat. These methods correspond to three
assumptions about what happens after a counter-detection:
1) nothing,
2) target evades, and
3) target attacks receiver.
The target's detection threshold is higher than the receiver's
as the target does not have the same sonar system or the
characteristics of the active pulse from the source platform
as the receiver. For simplicity, the target's sonar system is
assumed conservatively identical to the receiver's for
counter-detection calculations. The following notation is
used to help define the various counter-detection
calculations
:
J = ping on which receiver detects target for 1 st time,
J - ping on which target detects receiver for 1 st time, and
I or J = oo, if no detection during a given time period.
With this notation the Pd in equation 7 is the equivalent of
P{I±m), O)
where m is the time required for the target to transit through
the barrier.
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The first method determines counter-detection threat
by calculating a counter-detection probability and comparing
the result to the detection probability. Counter-detection
probability is based on the optimal strategies determined by
the linear program solver. The program, based on the optimal
receiver location and target entry point, determines the
counter-detection probability of the receiver. The counter-
detection probability is multiplied by the probability the
receiver will be located in that position and the probability
the target will enter the barrier at that point. All possible
combinations of optimal positions for both the target and
receiver are summed up as shown by
pcd=E [l-IId -p^)] p^p,, do)
where Pcd represents the overall counter-detection probability
of the receiver for a given source location. Pcdi is the
counter-detection probability of the receiver on the i th ping.
Pjq, is the mixed strategy probability for the receiver and Px
is the mixed strategy probability for the target. The mixed
strategy probability for the receiver comes from the solution
of the linear program in equation 8. The mixed strategy
probability for the target is the dual solution of the linear
program in equation 8.
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The second method determines the counter-detection
threat calculating the probability of the receiver detecting
the target before the target detects the receiver and before
time elapses, shown by
P(KJ and J<~) . (11)
This takes place of the detection probability of the target,
P(X<°°) = P(receiver detects the target) , (12)
in the payoff matrix.
The third method finds the probability of the receiver
detecting the target first and subtracts the probability of




and the result is stored in the payoff matrix. This method
will show if the target will have a significant chance of
detecting the receiver before the receiver detects the target
and thus be able to attack first.
The payoff matrix for the last two methods, when
evaluated using the linear program solver, yielded a strategy
for the receiver very similar to the original method one
payoff matrix. For model run-time considerations, only one
method of counter-detection threat assessment is used. The
first method is incorporated into the model as the strategy
results are similar to the other methods and a specific value
for counter-detection is found.
17
5 . Output
The output from the GAMS linear program solver is
written to an ASCII file and a Pascal program converts the
information to the final output file. Appendix B contains the
code for the conversion and output to the final output file.
This allows the output file to be appended as multiple
independent runs must be done to include data from all
possible source locations. The final output file contains the
optimal strategy for the receiver and the target, the overall
detection probability (or value of the game) , and a counter-




A. INTERPRETATIONS OF RESULTS
The model uses the sonar equation assumptions discussed
previously. The values for the barrier dimensions, receiver
and source locations, and target entry points are also
required for the model. The barrier dimensions are set at 200
kiloyards (kyds) in width and 40 kyds in depth. The target
enters the top of the barrier at 10 kyds intervals and
proceeds through. The possible receiver locations, within the
barrier, are at intervals of 5 kyds in both the X and Y axis.
Figure 4 graphically shows the barrier, target entry points
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Figure 4. Target entry points and receiver locations
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Figure 5. Possible source locations.
Note, in Figure 5 what appears to be straight vertical lines
are actually many small circles, representing source
locations, very close together.
At the completion of a model run for a given source
location, an optimal strategy and the value of the game
(overall detection probability) for the receiver is found.
The dual solution of the results provides the optimal barrier
entry point (s) for the target. In virtually every case the
optimum strategy is mixed for both the receiver and the target
platform. For example, with source located at the center of
20
the barrier (100,20), the optimal pure strategies for the























In almost all other cases the optimum pure strategies were
more numerous than for the example above.
Figure 6 shows the overall detection probability (value of
the game) for various source positions.












Figure 6. Value of the Game for various source positions
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Each of the 4,469 points in Figure 5 required separate solving
on a computer linear program solver. The highest overall
detection probability in Figure 6 occurs in two places, the
source located just off the center of the barrier at X
position 100 kyds and Y position 10 or 30 kyds . At this
location the receiver has a overall detection probability of
0.57. This high value for detection demonstrates the
usefulness of bistatic sonar. The detection probabilities are
symmetric about the center of the barrier on both the X and Y
axis. Values of detection probability around the center are
fairly close to the highest value. For this reason the
surface in Figure 6 has a well-rounded top. The receiver is
located at least 20 kyds away from the source, based on the
optimum mixed strategy. In most cases the receiver is located
in excess of 60 kyds from the source.
The most significant problem of placing the source near
the center of the barrier is the counter-detection threat to
the receiver. Figure 7 shows the counter-detection
probability for all possible source locations.
22
Counter-Detection Threat
Based on Source Position
Figure 7. Counter-detection threat.
The apparent noise of the counter-detection threat plot
results from the calculation method used. Counter-detection
probability is based on the optimal solution for the receiver
to detect the target. The receiver avoiding detection by the
target is not optimized.
Counter-detection probability is reduced significantly by
moving the source either up or down or left and right of the
center of the barrier. With the source located off the center
of the barrier, the detection probability is reduced only
slightly. Figure 8 shows the contour graph of the counter-




Based on Source Position
100
X Position in kiloyarda
Figure 8. Contour graph for the counter-detection threat.
At the conclusion of a model run data provided includes
overall detection probability, mixed strategy for the
receiver, mixed strategy for the target and counter-detection
threat to the receiver for a given source location. Multiple
runs of the model with varied source position allows for the
determination of the best strategy for both the receiver and
the source. These results contribute a tool for decision
making regarding the best receiver and source placement to
detect an enemy submarine.
24
B. UTILITY OF APPLICATION
The model provides a decision making tool regarding
submarine detection. Many different possible source and
receiver position scenarios can be evaluated with the output
data. Emphasis on detection of the target or counter-
detection of the receiver can easily be incorporated into the
decision making process.
The model provides a theoretical prediction of detection
probability of an enemy submarine transiting through a
barrier. The model results allow a user to evaluate the best
strategy given any number of constraints. These constraints
include source and receiver locations, barrier size, and
target entry point. Limitations on these factors could be a
result of geographical considerations or some other physical
constraints
.
Importance can be placed on either detection or the
counter-detection probabilities by review of the output from
the model. If the user is not concerned with being counter-
detected more emphasis can be placed on detection probability.
If however, the enemy submarine is very capable then the
counter-detection threat can be considered with greater
importance. These tools provided by the model allow the user
to make logical decisions based on the current situation.
Counter-detection cannot be minimized, however.
25
IV . PROGRAM
A. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TO RUN MODEL
The code portion of the model, written in Pascal computer
language, can be used on any IBM compatible personal computer.
The GAMS program requires at least a 386SX IBM compatible
personal computer to execute the linear program solver for the
model . A math coprocessor is not required, however it speeds
up both the Pascal code execution and the GAMS linear program
solver. Only 640 kilobytes of random access memory (RAM) is
needed for execution of the model, but more RAM speeds up the
GAMS linear program solver and allows for a virtual drive to
be created. The virtual drive is used to speed up the storing
and retrieving of temporary data during model runs.
B. LIMITATIONS OF THE CODE
The most significant problem with the model is execution
time for the program. The model ran on an IBM compatible
486DX-25 MHz machine with 8 megabytes of RAM. Each run for a
given source location took two hours to complete. When the
model was run on a 386SX-20 MHz machine with math-coprocessor
and 5 megabytes of RAM, execution time was six hours for each
run. The model run time factor limits the number of source
locations to be evaluated. The model runs takes advantage of
symmetry about the center point of the barrier as discussed in
26
the Results section. These long run-times are in spite of
considerable effort spent in writing code efficiently. For
example, the equation to determine target strength contains a
sine squared (sin J (6B )) term. With the use of some
trigonometric functions, sin J (0B ) could be represented by
KSTKTR ™
[Ref. 9], where RST is the distance between the source and
target, R^ is the distance between the target and the
receiver, and RST is the distance between the source and the
receiver. The other two terms (hST and hm ) are the horizontal
distances between the source and the target, and the target
and the receiver respectfully. The horizontal distances were
the only new calculation required, as the distances between
platforms are already calculated (each requires a square root)




The use of active bistatic sonar provides a new method of
detecting very quiet nuclear and diesel-electric submarines.
Bistatic sonar takes advantage of the bearing and range
information from active sonar and the stealth of passive sonar
by using a separate source and receiver. The development of
a model incorporating bistatic sonar allows for the
determination of the optimal strategies for both the receiver
and source platforms.
Multiple model runs are required to find the optimal
strategy for the receiver and the source. In each case
evaluated, for a given source location, the program yielded a
mixed strategy for the receiver. Comparing the overall
detection probability (value of the game) for each model run,
for a given source location, provides a method for optimum
source placement . There are multiple source locations
yielding similar detection probabilities.
The mixed strategy for the receiver, with a given source
location, places the receiver at least 20 kiloyards (kyds)
from the source and in most cases outside 60 kyds. If the
optimum receiver strategy placed it very close to the source,




The counter-detection threat to the receiver is calculated
based on the optimal strategy of detection for the receiver.
The highest threat occurs within the middle of the barrier.
By placing the source away from the center of the barrier
counter-detection threat drops significantly while the
detection probability remains fairly constant.
All the previous results provide tools for the employment
of a receiver and a source platform to best detect a
transiting enemy submarine. With the counter-detection threat
and mixed strategy results for the receiver, many different
combinations of receiver and source locations can be
considered.
B. POSSIBLE FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH
Two possible avenues for further research include: use of
actual target strength, sonar system parameters and
environmental data; and simulation of mixed strategies for the
receiver, target and source. The use of real data for target
strength, sonar system parameters and environmental data,
would yield more accurate results. It also allows for
evaluation of an actual search scenario with a known searcher
and target platform. This approach would make the model more
of a tactical decision aid.
Developing a simulation program would help confirm the
results yielded from the model. It would allow for the
comparison of the model to data generated by repeated
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simulations. AT&T Bell laboratories have developed a
simulation program, Submarine Surveillance Simulator (S 3 ),






LT Aasgeir Gangsaas USN
Naval Postgraduate School
Thesis work on Bistatic Sonar
Turbo Pascal 6.0
The main program reads in the user inputs about the
receiver, target and the source. Also the user inputs about
the environment . With this information the program
calculates the signal excess as the target transits through
the barrier. This signal excess is converted into a




Readln and DetermineProb that are
explained below.}
Uses DOS, Normal, Signal4, Gamsform;
Const Sigma = 8
;
Var Sx, Sy, WBarrier, DBarrier
Dz, Dx, Dy, Freq, Pingln, Num
PulseL, TSpeed, Rx, Ry, Tx, Ty










{ This procedure reads in the source location data for
multiple source locations. It ensures the proper source
location sequence for the multiple model runs.}







Assign (Temp, 'D: \TP\WORK\Num.txt
' )
;










FOR I := 1 to J DO
Readln (DatalnSource, N, X,Y)
;



















{ This procedure reads in from a file (Thes.in)
information about the receiver and the target needed for the
program.
}
Var Dataln : Text;
BEGIN












































END; { Procedure Readln}
Procedure DetermineProb;
{ This procedure calculates the detection probability
matrix for the receiver for each receiver location and
target entry point.}
Var TotalDz, TotalDx, TotalDy
CI, C2, C3, TotalTime,Tl,T2





























FreqSq := SQR (Freq/1000 )
;
a := (0.1*FreqSq/ (1+FreqSq) ) +(40*FreqSq/ (4100+FreqSq)
)
+( (2 .75E-04) *FreqSq)
;
WHILE (C3 <= WBarrier) DO
BEGIN
WHILE (C2 <= DBarrier) DO
BEGIN
WHILE (CI <= WBarrier) DO
BEGIN
Tl := 0;
WHILE (Tl <= TotalTime) DO
BEGIN
SE := SignalExcess (Sx, Sy, Tx, Ty, Rx, Ry,
PulseL, a, TSmax, TSmin,
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NL, SL, AG, DT)
;
IF (Tl = 0) THEM
Temp := 1 - NormalValue (SE/ Sigma)
ELSE
Temp := Temp* ( 1 -NormalValue ( SE/ Sigma ))
;
Ty := Ty - (TSpeed/ ( 3*10 ) ) *PingIn;
Tl := Tl + Pingln;
END;
Ty : = DBarrier;
T2 := 0;
Write (Dataout, (1 - Temp):6:3);
CI := CI + Dz;


















**********7k-****7k-****** Main Program ********************
BEGIN
Det ermine Prob;
FormatG (Trunc (WBarrier) , Trunc (DBarrier) , Dx, Dy, Dz);
IF (Done) THEN






{ Determines signal excess for the receiver and the
target based on the bistatic active sonar equation.}
Interface
Const C = 8.685889638;
Function SignalExcess ( Sx, Sy, Tx, Ty, Rx, Ry, PL, a,
TSmax, TSmin, NL, SL, AG, DT : Real): Real;
Implementation
Function SignalExcess ( Sx, Sy, Tx, Ty, Rx, Ry, PL, a,
TSmax, TSmin, NL, SL, AG, DT : Real): Real;
Var ThR, ThS , Rst, Rtr, Rsr, an, TS : Real;
hi, h2, TLst, TLtr, Ftemp : Real;
BEGIN
Rst := SQRT(SQR(Tx - Sx) + SQR(Ty - Sy)
)
Rtr := SQRT(SQR(Tx - Rx) + SQR(Ty - Ry)
Rsr := SQRT(SQR(Rx - Sx) + SQR(Ry - Sy)
hi := Tx - Sx;
h2 := Tx - Rx;
IF ((Rst + Rtr) < (Rsr + 4800*PL/3000 ) ) THEN
SignalExcess : = -100.00
ELSE
BEGIN
{ Target Strength part, TS}
an := ( 1/ (Rst*Rtr) ) * (hl*h2 + . 25* ( SQR (Rsr ) -
SQR(Rst - Rtr) ) )
;
TS := (TSmax - TSmin) + (TSmin*an)
;
{ Transmission Loss part for both paths, TLst, TLtr}
TLst := (C*LN(Rst*1000) ) + (a*Rst);








{ This function determines the cumulative normal





Function NormalValue (x : Real): Real;
Implementation
Const dl = 4.9867347E-02;
d2 = 2 .11410061E-02;




EPS = 0.0 00 01;
Function NormalValue (x : Real): Real;
Var px, xl, x2 , xt : Real;
BEGIN
xt := SQRT(SQR(x) )
;




xl := 1 + dl*xt + d2*SQR(xt) + d3*EXP ( 3 *ln (xt ) ) +
d4*SQR(SQR(xt) ) + d5*EXP ( 5*ln (xt ) ) +
d6*EXP(6*ln(xt) )
;
x2 := 0.5*EXP(-l*16*ln(xl) )
;
END;
IF (x > 0.0) THEN
px : = 1 - x2
ELSE







{ This procedure converts the output from the main









Procedure AdvanceData (Var CI Integer; Dz, C : Integer;
Var DataOutOLD : Text )
;
Var I, J : Integer;
T : Real;
BEGIN
J := (C - 1)*7;





Procedure FormatG (WBarrier , DBarrier, Dx, Dy, Dz :
Integer)
Var DataOutOLD, DataOutNEW
TCI, CT, LZ, CI, C2, C3










Assign (DataOutOLD, 'F:\THES.OUT' )
;
Assign (DataOutNEW, 'F:\THES.DAT' )
Rewrite (DataOutNEW)
;





WHILE (C3 <= WBarrier) DO
BEGIN
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IF (C3 = 0) THEN






IF (C3 < 10) THEN
Txp : = '00'
ELSE
BEGIN
IF (C3 < 100) THEN








, Txp, C3 )
;
Z : = Z + 1 ;






















WHILE (C2 <= DBarrier) DO
BEGIN
IF (C2 = 0) THEN
Write (DataOutNEW, '00' ,C2)
ELSE
BEGIN
IF (C2 < 10) THEN
Typ : = '00'
ELSE
BEGIN
IF (C2 < 100) THEN









Z := Z + 1;







C2 := C2 + Dy;
END;








WHILE (CI <= WBarrier) DO
BEGIN










Z : = Z + 1 ;
END;

































WHILE (((TCA MOD 8) <> 0) AND (C <= LZ ) ) DO
BEGIN
Write (DataOutNEW, TCI :7)
;
TCA : = TCA + 1
;
C := C + 1;






WHILE (C3 <= WBarrier) DO
BEGIN
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WHILE (C2 <= DBarrier) DO
BEGIN
IF (C3 < 10) THEN
Txp : = '00'
ELSE
BEGIN
IF (C3 < 100) THEN




IF (C2 < 10) THEN
Typ : = '00'
ELSE
BEGIN
IF (C2 < 100) THEN




Write (DataOutNEW, Txp, C3, ' .
'
, Typ,C2, ' ' )
;
IF (CT > 1) THEN
AdvanceData (CI, Dz, CT, DataOutOLD);
TCB : = 1
;





Write (DataOutNEW, Temp: 7 :3) ;
CI := CI + Dz;







C2 := C2 + Dy;
END;
C2 := 0;






IF (C <= LZ) THEN
Write (DataOutNEW,
'
CT := CT + 1;
UNTIL (C > LZ) ;










A. GAMS FORMULATION PROGRAM
$TITLE Bistatic Sonar Problem for Thesis
$STITLE By LT Aasgeir Gangsaas USN
* GAMS and DOLLAR CONTROL OPTIONS
$OFFUPPER OFFSYMLIST OFFSYMXREF
OPTIONS
LIMCOL=0 , LIMROW =0 , SOLPRINT=OFF , DECIMALS=3
RESLIM=100, ITERLIM=10000, OPTCR =0.0 , SEED =3141;




PR(X,Y) distribution of effort;
VARIABLE






COL(P).. SUM( (X, Y) , PR(X, Y) *PAYOFF(X, Y, P) ) =G=V;
PROB.. SUM( (X, Y) , PR(X, Y) ) =E= 1;
MODEL ZEROSUM /ALL/;
SOLVE ZEROSUM USING LP MAXIMIZING V;
Reports
COL.M(P) $ (COL.M(P) EQ EPS) = 0.0 00 0;
DISPLAY V.L, PR.L, COL.M;
file output 1 /D: \ TP\WORK\GAMOUT. DAT/
;
put output 1;




put x.TL:7, y.TL:7, PR . L ( X , Y) : 8 : 4 /;
) ;




put p.TL:7, COL.M(P):8:4 / ;
) ;
B. FINAL OUTPUT CONVERSION
Program CumResults;
{ This procedure takes the output from the GAMS program
and outputs the results to files to cumulate results.}
Uses DOS, Normal, Signal4;
Const EPS = 0.0001;
Sigma = 8;
Var INDATA1 , INDATA2 , INDATA3 : Text
INDATA4, OUTDATA, OUTDATATEMP : Text
OUTDATA1 : Text
Sx, Sy, I, PI, P2, FreqSq : Real
SumTemp, a, Tx, Ty, Rx, Ry : Real
Temp, SE, TSmax, TSmin, NL : Real
SL, AG, DT : Real
N, C, No, P, Tl, T2 : Integer;
PulseL, TSpeed, Freq : Integer;




{ This procedure reads in from a file (Thes.in) which
contains information about the receiver, target and source
needed for the program.
}
Var Dataln : Text
;
BEGIN



































Readln Dataln, NL) ;
Readln Dataln) /
Readln Dataln, SL) ;
Readln Dataln) i
Readln Dataln, AG) ;
Readln Dataln) /
Readln Dataln, DT) ;
D; {Pirocedure Readln}
{
******************** Main Program ************************
BEGIN
Readln;

























FreqSq := SQR (Freq/1000 )
;
a := (0.1*FreqSq/ (1 + FreqSq)) + ( 40*FreqSq/ ( 4100
FreqSq)) + ( (2 . 75E-04 ) *FreqSq:
TotalTime := Trunc ( (DBarrier/ (TSpeed*2 )) *60 )
;
Readln ( INDATA1 , I )
;
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Readln ( INDATA4 , N) ;
Readln(INDATA3)
;
FOR C := 1 to (N - 1) DO
Readln ( INDATA3 , No , Sx , Sy )
;













Writeln (OUTDATA, ' Source Position (in thousands of
yards ) : ' ) ;




Writeln (OUTDATA, ' Value of the Game: ',1:5:3);
Writeln (OUTDATA)




Writeln (OUTDATA, ' X Y probability');
WHILE not eof (INDATA1) DO
BEGIN
Readln ( INDATA1 , Rx , Ry , PI )
;
IF (PI > EPS) THEN
BEGIN
Writeln(OUTDATA,Rx:6:l,Ry:6:l, Pi: 13 :3)
;










Writeln (OUTDATA, ' X probability');
WHILE not eof ( INDATA2 ) DO
BEGIN




P2 := -1 * P2;
IF (P2 > EPS) THEN
BEGIN
Writeln (OUTDATA, P : 5 , P2 : 12 : 3 )
;
WHILE not eof (OUTDATATEMP) DO
BEGIN
Tx : = P
Ty :- DBarrier;




WHILE (Tl <= TotalTime) DO
BEGIN
SE := SignalExcess (Sx, Sy, Rx, Ry, Tx, Ty,
PulseL, a, TSmax, TSmin,
NL, SL, AG, DT) ;
IF (Tl = 0) THEN
Temp := 1 - NormalValue ( SE/ Sigma)
ELSE
Temp := Temp* ( 1-NormalValue ( SE/Sigma) )
;
Ty := Ty - (TSpeed/ ( 3 *10 ) ) *PingIn;
Tl : = Tl + Pingln;
END;







Writeln (OUTDATA, 'Counterdetection probability:
'
, SumTemp : 5 : 3 )
;
Writeln (OUTDATA)
^j„ Lpij. / qtj'T'DATA '**************************************' ) •
Writeln (OUTDATA1, (N - 1 ) : 4 , I : 7 : 3 , SumTemp : 7 : 3 )
;








1. Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Volume 13 Number 1,
The Emergence of Low-Frequency Active Acoustics as a
Critical Antisubmarine Warfare Technology, by G . D. Tyler,
January-March 1992.
2. Owen, G., Game Theory 2 nd edition, Academic Press, 1982.
3. Washburn, A. R., Search and Detection 2nd edition, ORSA
Books, 1989.
4. Abramowitz, M., and Stegun, I. A., Handbook of
Mathematical Functions with Formulas , Graphs, and
Mathematical Tables, U. S. Government Printing Office,
1968.
5. Urick, R. J., Principles of Underwater Sound 3 rd Edition,
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1983.
6. Hazeltine Corporation Report 6165, Operations Analysis of
a Multistatic Echo-Ranging System, by R. A. Shade,
December 1972
.
7. Stefanick, A., Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Naval
Strategy, Lexington Books, 1987.
8. Washburn, A. R., Notes on Game Theory, Class notes for the
Naval Postgraduate School, 1989.
9. Interview between I. Fischer, Adjunct Professor, Naval
Postgraduate School, Mathematics Department, Monterey CA,
and the author, 25 September 1992.
46
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
1. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145









Attn: Chris Vogt 7-322
Laurel, MD 20723-6099
4. Dr. Stanley Benkoski
Wagner Associates
894 Ross Dr. Suite 205
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
5. LT Aasgeir Gangsaas USN
16047 N.E. 27 th St.
Bellevue, WA 98008
6. Department of the Navy
Navy Tactical Support Activity
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC 20374
7 Department of the Navy












Naval Research and Development, Code 43 3
NCCOSC RDTE Div
San Diego, CA 92152-5000
47
Department of the Navy
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N87
Pentagon
Washington, DC 20350
48




DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
NA\'4LP0STGRADUA)L oCHOOl
.viONTEREY CA 93943-5101
GAYLORD S

